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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs 
DANNY DUANE BUCK, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 19772 
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a supplementary brief as requested by the Sup-
reme Court after oral argument on the issue of whether the 
search in this case constitutes a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Defen-
dant/Appellate submits this brief as supplement to Argument 
II of the original brief filed in this matter and hereby 
requests that both Argument II of the original brief and this 
brief be read together. 
I S S U E 
THE SEARCH, AS EXECUTED IN THIS CASE, VIOLATES THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES IN 
THAT ENTRY WITHOUT KNOCK AND NOTIFICATION WAS NOT AUTHORIZED 
BY THE MAGISTRATE NOR BY ANY ALLOWED EXCEPTION TO THE WARRANT 
REQUIREMENT. 
Under the Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, 
the people have a right "to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures," and such right "shall not be violated, and no 
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by 
oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to 
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." This 
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, with 
its accompanying sanctions that evidence so obtained be exclu-
ded at trial is applicable to the states through the Four-
teenth Amendment. U.S. v. Ellingsworth, 306 F.2d 231, 234-
(0. Deleware, 1969); U.S. v. Tracy, 233 F.Supp. 423, 425 
(E.D. Penn. 1964). 
At issue here is the constitutionality under the Fourth 
Amendment, of a search and seizure where the officers forc-
ibly entered the defendant's home, without warning, pursuant 
to a search warrant on which did not appear the required 
approval for such an entry. 
In determining the legality of the search and seizure, 
federal rather than state standards are to be applied in 
determining reasonableness of state search and seizures. 
U.S. v. Tracy, supra at 425-6. Lawfulness of method of entry 
is to be determined by state law only insofar as it is not 
violative of the federal Constitution. U.S. v. Gable, 276 F. 
Supp. 555, 557 (E.D. Penn. 1967). In other words, state 
standards may not be broader than the Federal Constitution, 
but may be narrower. That officers had valid search and 
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arrest warrants is not relevant to legality and reasonableness of 
method of entry or failure to give required notice of pur-
pose. Ijd. at 557-8. "Method of entry" requirements are 
analogous in purpose to Fourth Amendment requirements; both 
operate as limitations on police conduct within an indivi-
dual's constitutionally protected zone of privacy. Id. 
The requirement of prior notice of 
authority and purpose before forcing 
entry into a home is deeply rooted in our 
heritage and should not be given grudging 
application. Congress, codifying a tradi-
tion embedded in Anglo-American law, has 
declared in [18 U.S.C.] §3109 the rever-
ence of the law for the individual's 
right of privacy in his house. Every 
householder, the good and the bad, the 
guilty and the innocent, is entitled to 
the protection designed to secure the com-
mon interest against unlawful invasion of 
the house. The petitioner could not be 
lawfully arrested in his home by officers 
breaking in without first giving him no-
tice of their authority and purpose. 
Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 
313 (1958). 
18 U.S.C. §3109, which is an effort to codify what is now the 
common law of the Fourth Amendment as well as most state 
statutes, requires officers executing a warrant are required 
to "knock and announce" upon arrival at the place to be 
searched. U.S. V. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195 (Ninth Cir. 1984); 
U.S. v. Ellingsworth, supra; U.S. v. Gable, supra; U.S. v. 
Tracy, supra. Whether failure of executing officers to 
follow formal requirements for the execution of a search 
warrant will lead to the supression of evidence seized 
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depends in large part on the reasonableness of the search in 
question. 
The knock and announce requirements of 18 U.S.C. §3109 
clarify Fourth Amendment protections, U.S. v. Searp, 586 F.2d 
1117 (6th Cir. 1978); even though the requirements may not 
actually rise to a constitutional level. Ker v. California, 
374 U.S. 23 (1963) (Brennan, J. dissenting); Sabbath v. U.S. , 
391 U.S. 585, 591 n. 8 (1968). Whether the rule is consi-
dered constitutionally mandated or statutorily mandated, 
supression is granted where the court finds the requirements 
of the section have not been satisfied. U.S. v. Kulscar, 586 
F.2d 1283 (9th Cir. 1978). 
In the case at hand the search warrant clearly did not 
authorize the officers to enter the defendant's home without 
first knocking and stating their purpose. The state has 
claimed mistake since the executing officers failed to notice 
discrepancies between the warrant and the affidavit. The 
reasonableness of the method of entry, however, must be 
judged on the facts and circumstances existing at the time of 
entry. U.S. v. Tracy, supra at 427. The only excuse for non-
compliance with an existing statutory requirement of notice 
would be a court recognized exception. There i s no Utah case 
on point and the U.S. Supreme Court, ". . . has apparently 
approved three other exceptions: '(1) Where the persons 
within already know of the officers' authority and purpose, 
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or (2) where the officers are justified in the belief that 
persons within are in imminent peril of bodily harm, or (3) 
where those within, made aware of the presence of someone 
outside (because, for example, there has been a knock at the 
door) are then engaged in activity which justifies the offi-
cers in the belief that an escape or the destruction of 
evidence is being attempted....1 [Also] 'a police officer's 
reasonable belief that announcement might place him or his 
associates in physical peril' would excuse compliance with 
the statute." United States v. Nolan, 718 F.2d 589, 596 (3d 
Cir. 1983). None of those exceptions are present in the 
facts of this case. 
The circuit courts have generally held that evidence shoul-
be suppressed where there has been prejudice to the defendant o 
where noncompliance has been deliberate or in willful disregard 
of the rules. U.S. v. Turner, 558 F.2d 4-6 (2nd Cir. 1977); U.S 
v. Burgard, 551 F.2d 190 (8th Cir. 1977); U.S. v. Dauphinee, 53. 
F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1976). Here, the executing officers were unde: 
a duty to perform the search and seizure according to the guide 
lines set forth by a neutral magistrate. The warrant issued he 
did not authorize the officers' forcible entry and their disreg 
of the warrant's provisions should be viewed as a serious breach 
of duty. 
Various courts have recognized that officers may enter 
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without knocking and announcing when there are reasonable 
grounds to believe that compliance would endanger the offi-
cers, Ker v. California, supra; or if there is likelihood 
that the occupants will attempt to escape, U.S. v. Manning 
448 F.2d 992 (2nd Cir. 1971); destroy evidence, U.S. v. 
Carter, 566 F.2d 1265 (5th Cir. 1976); harm someone who is 
inside, People v. Polito, 355 N.E.2d 725 (111. App. 1976), 
cert, denied, 434 U.S. 873 (1977); or when officers are in 
hot pursuit of a suspect, U.S. v. Flores, 540 F.2d 432 (9th 
Cir. 1976). These headings are often grouped together under 
the general heading of exigent circumstances. U.S. v. 
McConney, supra at 1198. 
However, as defendant's brief points out, none of these 
exigent circumstances existed in this case. There was no one 
present in the home upon the officers' arrival, so there was 
no reason to believe a forcible entry was necessary. 
In addition, the officers' conduct was contrary to the 
interests protected by the Fourth Amendment; the prevention 
of violence or physical injury to the police and to innocent 
persons who may be on the premises, avoid unexpected exposure 
of the occupant's priate activities, and prevent damage resul-
ting from forced entry. People v. Cassias, 563 P. 2d 926 
(Colo. 1977). The officers not only forcibly broke the 
defendant's front door, but the back was broken into also. 
The method of entry also significantly increased the risk of 
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violence as the defendant, were he at home, might have tried 
to defend his home from attack. 
Thus, under prohibitions set forth in the Fourth Amend-
ment, the evidence seized from the defendant should be found 
unreasonable. The officers' entry of the home was in clear 
violation of the warrant provisions calling for a "knock and 
announced" entry. Their disregard of the warrant was clearly 
erroneous. 
In addition, viewing the "totality of the surrounding 
circumstances," one also must conclude, again, that the offi-
cers' entry was unlawful. The total absence of any activity 
in the home, when the officers have no notice of danger, 
means the executing offiers should have knocked before enter-
ing. This is especially true given the terms of the warrant. 
C O N C L U S I O N 
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United Sta 
protects an individual and his home against unreasonable 
searches. When a valid search warrant exists the courts have 
insisted that a search is still unreasonable and not legal 
unless it is also executed properly or under some extreme 
circumstances, allowing exception. This was not done in the 
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case at bar. The search warrant was executed contrary to the 
face of the warrant, contrary to state statute and federal 
requirements that proper notice be given prior to entry. 
Therefore, the search is in violation of the Fourth Amendment 
and should not be allowed. 
Respectfully submitted this 
OSs? day of September, 1985. 
Attorney foryDefendant/Appellant 
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